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Cryptomarkets and the Returns to Criminal Experience
Abstract
Criminal capital theory suggests more experienced offenders receive higher returns from crime.
Offenders who accrue skills over their criminal career are better able to minimize detection,
increase profits, and navigate illegal markets. Yet shifts in the offending landscape to
technologically-dependent crimes have led some to suggest that the skills necessary to be
successful in conventional crimes no longer apply, meaning ‘traditional’ criminals may be left
behind. The recent turn of drug vendors to online markets provides an opportunity to investigate
whether ‘street smarts’ translate to success in technologically-dependent crimes. This study
surveys 51 drug vendors on online drug markets to compare individuals who began their drugselling career in physical drug markets with vendors whose onset began on digital platforms. The
focus is on their criminal earnings while comparing the scope and management of their networks.
The results inform potential spillover effects from offline drug-selling into online marketplaces.
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Introduction
The unequal distribution of criminal earnings defines illicit marketplaces. While a minority of
offenders make substantial incomes from their crimes, the majority compete to earn anything
beyond a minimum wage. Much of the theoretical and empirical work examining variation in
criminal earnings has focused on an offender’s skill set and expertise at committing crimes –
otherwise known as their criminal capital (McCarthy & Hagan, 1995). The role of criminal capital
in explaining offender success has been empirically demonstrated multiple times. Offenders with
more experience accrue higher earnings (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy & Hagan, 1995; 2001;
Morselli, Tremblay & McCarthy, 2006; Nguyen & Bouchard, 2013) and are better equipped to
evade detection (Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010), as compared to their less proficient counterparts.
Much of the research on criminal capital has modeled the returns to crime using traditional
offender populations. However, technological shifts have opened pathways for offenders to
commit crimes in the digital realm. Crimes enabled by an internet connection break down physical
barriers, reduce the need for face-to-face interaction, and shift the skill sets needed to be successful
in crime. As crime relocates to illicit online markets, it raises questions about whether expertise
acquired in physical settings carries over to digital contexts. Indeed, shifts to digital platforms
provide new opportunities to investigate the determinants of success for online offenders. Whether
findings on criminal capital extend to online environments may help us better understand the
pathways through which offenders divert into and remain on online markets and strategies to curb
online offending.
Prompted by past work investigating criminal achievement in traditional offender
populations, this paper explores whether offenders who accrue experience in physical drug markets
receive higher criminal earnings in online drug markets. To do so, we survey online drug vendors
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about their entry into drug selling, illicit earnings, and criminal collaborators, among other factors.
We then analyze vendors’ criminal earnings across individuals who began selling drugs in offline
markets versus online markets while also comparing their demographics and the management of
their distribution networks. We conclude by discussing the potential spillover effects from offline
drug markets into online marketplaces.
The Returns to Crime
Early characterizations of illicit drug markets portrayed them as lucrative enterprises, with drug
traffickers earning universally high profits. In one of the first tests of these anecdotal claims,
Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter (1992) showed illicit income from drug selling was highly
variable. Interviewing 186 probationers who had recently earned income from drug sales, they
observed that the net income of the “typical small earner” was 25 USD monthly. In contrast, the
“typical large earner” made upwards of 2,500 USD monthly (p. 485). The authors concluded that
while a minority of drug sellers received high incomes from their sales, the majority received much
smaller sums (also see Fagan, 1992; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; Morselli & Tremblay, 2004;
Nguyen & Loughran, 2017; Reuter et al., 1990). Recent examinations of drug sellers’ transaction
histories in online drug markets have led to similar conclusions. For instance, examining drug
sellers’ online revenues, Décary-Hétu, Paquet-Clouston, and Aldridge (2016) found that the
equivalent “small earner” made gross earnings of 63 USD per month, and the “large earner”
approximately 2,808 USD per month (also see Duxbury & Haynie, 2021). Illicit earnings are
highly skewed across online and offline drug markets, while some offenders earn substantial
incomes, others occupy peripheral roles in the illicit economy.
Substantial research has explored the determinants of criminal earnings in offline markets;
however, relatively scarce attention has been paid to the success of offenders in online settings.
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Often referred to as cybercrime, offences enabled by access to a network connection have led to a
host of illicit behaviors not previously within the purview of criminological studies. Whether these
offence-types represent ‘new crimes’ or simply variations of traditional crimes, scholars
increasingly concern themselves with these phenomena (Maimon & Louderback, 2019). Studies
of online offenders suggest that they may comprise a distinct population, but it is unclear whether
that influences variation in their earnings. Here we review what we know about the returns to crime
in physical markets and whether experience accrued in offline markets can translate into higher
earnings in the digital realm.
The Returns to Crime in Offline Markets
More than 25 years ago, McCarthy and Hagan (1995) termed the phenomena of ‘criminal capital’
to explain the differential success of offenders. Defined as the “knowledge and technical skills that
can facilitate successful criminal activity” (p. 66), criminal capital has since become a staple of
studies aiming to uncover the determinants of illicit earnings (Loughran et al., 2013; Matsueda et
al., 1992; McCarthy & Hagan, 1995; 2001; Morselli et al., 2006; Morselli & Tremblay, 2004;
Nguyen, Parker & Simpson, 2021; Nguyen et al., 2017; Rowen, McGloin & Nguyen, 2018; Uggen
& Thompson, 2003). Work examining criminal capital has focused on both an offender’s criminal
social capital, which “arises from associations with skilled offenders” and their criminal human
capital, the “specialized skills and knowledge about offending” (McCarthy & Hagan, 2001, p.
1038) to explain variation in success.
Much of the work focusing on criminal social capital has shown that connections with
other offenders lead to important benefits for an individual’s illicit earnings. Connections with
other criminals increase the likelihood of earnings (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy & Hagan,
1995; 2001; Morselli & Tremblay, 2004; Morselli et al., 2006; Morselli et al., 2017; Rowan et al.,
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2018). Morselli and Tremblay (2004) introduced the idea that it wasn’t simply the number of
criminal contacts an offender had that predicted their success but rather how these contacts were
connected. Individuals embedded in non-redundant networks - brokering connections between
their criminal contacts - were better positioned to profit from their crimes (see Morselli, 2001;
Morselli et al., 2006; Morselli & Roy, 2008). More recently, Morselli, Paquet-Clouston and
Provost (2017) again demonstrated that an individual’s network position was a better predictor of
success, here defined as the volume of drugs a participant handled than even their status within the
organization. Together, these works highlight the salient nature of an individual’s position within
their criminal network as a determinant of their success in illicit markets.
Work on criminal human capital shows prior experience also plays an important role for
criminal earnings. Numerous proxies have been used to measure experience, including age at first
crime, criminal justice contact, and specialization (Loughran et al., 2013; Matsueda et al., 1992;
McCarthy & Hagan, 2001; Nguyen & Bouchard, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2017; 2021; Tremblay &
Morselli, 2001; Uggen & Thompson, 2003). In one of the most compelling demonstrations of the
link between an offender’s criminal experience and their returns to crime, Loughran et al. (2013)
demonstrated that the cumulative frequency in which an individual engaged in income-generating
crimes in the past six months played an important role in explaining an offender’s illegal wage
rate.1 The finding that individuals with more criminal experience report higher earnings has been
observed across offending populations (e.g., Morselli & Tremblay, 2004; Nguyen & Bouchard,
2013). Together, these results suggest that offenders learn from prior crimes, honing their skill sets
to increase future profits.

1

Measured as individuals’ total reported illicit earnings as a function of the number of weeks they worked an illicit
job.
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Criminal social capital and criminal human capital intersect in ways that allow offenders
to learn from their own crimes and those of others to earn higher incomes. Indeed, Nguyen (2020)
empirically demonstrates that, in a prison context, criminal capital is unidimensional - individuals
highest in criminal social capital were also those highest in criminal human capital. In other words,
both an individual’s connections with other criminals and their own crime-specific expertise lead
to important benefits for their illicit earnings (also see McCarthy & Hagan, 2001). However, much
of what we know about variation in criminal earnings comes from studies of offenders engaged in
crimes in the physical realm and has yet to foray into how criminal capital influences earnings in
cyber-dependent crimes. This represents an important gap, as research on criminal capital suggests
that the dimensions critical to success may be distinct for online offences compared to those
perpetrated offline (Nguyen, 2020, p. 209). Likewise, the cybercrime literature raises questions
about whether the skills and expertise to be a successful drug seller in physical markets carry over
to online markets.
The Returns to Crime in Online Markets
Although prior work has primarily explored variation in criminal earnings in offline settings, it has
not been completely ignored in online crimes. A growing body of research has begun to assess the
features that distinguish more successful offenders in online markets. This work highlights
similarities and differences between online and offline markets in terms of the role of criminal
contacts and the skills and expertise to be successful.
Some scholars question the benefits of offline criminal contacts for drug sellers’ online
success, which may not carry the same perks in digital marketplaces. One of the key innovations
of online marketplaces is that they supply vendors with access to a centralized pool of potential
buyers and rating systems, allowing vendors to build online reputations to attract clients,

6

independent of ‘who they know’ in the physical world (Diekmann et al., 2014; Jiao, Przeopiorka
& Buskens, 2021; Przeopiorka et al., 2017). Past work shows online reputations are one of the
main ways customers select sellers on online marketplaces (Duxbury & Haynie, 2018), and
vendors with established online reputations who expand their operations to a new market are more
likely to be successful than new market entrants (Norbutas, Ruiter & Corten, 2020b). However,
once vendors establish trusted exchange relationships with customers, they are more likely to
continue their patronage, even if vendors receive negative reviews from other third parties
(Norbutas, Ruiter & Corten, 2020a). Indeed, vendors who develop established customer bases and
are embedded in transaction networks where buyers indirectly refer other customers have higher
monthly revenues on illicit marketplaces (Duxbury & Haynie, 2021). In these contexts, online drug
sellers may not be as reliant on ‘brokers’ who have the necessary contacts to procure bulk orders
of drugs and distribute them to local sellers as their offline counterparts. Rather online drug sellers
establish their own digital identities to secure customer bases on online marketplaces, as compared
to offline drug sellers who may rely on personal ties for referrals.
Indeed, the shift from physical to virtual platforms means that face-to-face interactions
have in many ways been replaced by online channels of communication (van Hout & Bingham,
2013). Online forums also provide vendors with access to other drug sellers from whom they can
learn more about online drug sales. Ladegaard (2020) showed how online drug sellers consulted
discussion forums to decide which online marketplaces to sell their shops. Norbutas (2020) found
that online drug sellers who engaged in social interactions in online discussion forums had higher
sales and established more exchange relationships with customers, even after controlling for their
reputation. Indeed, forums provide milieus for individuals to exchange information to learn the
skills and expertise to successfully carry out crimes (Holt & Copes, 2010) and techniques to elude
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detection (Aldridge & Askew, 2017).
Yet, other researchers find evidence that offline criminal contacts play an important role in
online crimes, including curbing distrust (Bulanova-Hristova et al., 2016; Leukfeldt et al., 2017;
2019; Lusthaus, 2019). For instance, Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017) show that many of the
individuals engaged in online crimes forged relationships offline, counting among their
accomplices’ individuals from their neighborhood, with whom they had family ties, or belonged
to the same school or sports team. Although offline ties played a prominent role in many groups,
the individuals who consulted online forums were better equipped to increase their criminal skills.
Indeed, Leukfeldt, Kleemans, Kruisbuergen and Roks (2019) found that individuals involved in
more ‘high-tech cybercrimes’ were more likely to rely on online contacts than individuals in ‘lowtech cybercrimes’ who drew more heavily from offline social relationships. Thus, individuals with
offline drug selling experience may continue to rely on offline contacts, having better access to
established suppliers that can procure a higher quality product and maintain reliable supply chains
than online sellers.
Of particular relevance to our research is the suggestion that online markets also require
new and different skillsets than those required in offline markets. For instance, sales on
cryptomarkets often necessitate that transactions be done using anonymizing cryptocurrencies,
such as Bitcoin. Setting up a wallet, making sales, and converting these cryptocurrencies into
usable currency all require a degree of technical proficiency. In addition, vendors must market
their illicit wares, attracting clientele through appealing photos and descriptions of their products.
Creating and managing online storefronts thus requires that offenders have a degree of technical
expertise, in contrast to offline markets, traditionally characterized by quick buys and cash
payments.

8

Lastly, there is also reason to believe that online drug sellers are motivated more by longerterm profits than offline drug sellers. For instance, Jacques and Wright (2015) observed quick fixes
and fast money characterize physical drug markets, where drug vendors make quick sales that lead
to immediate returns. In contrast, online drug sales require multiple steps before a transaction is
completed. Vendors are required to set up an online storefront on a site (i.e., vendor account),
which may include a ‘deposit’ to secure a spot on the market, build their reputation (i.e., feedback),
and then after a transaction has been completed, convert cryptocurrency into usable currencies. In
this sense, online drug sellers may more closely mirror vendors active on licit online markets, such
as eBay or Amazon platforms, where they invest time in building their online brand in order to
make returns later on (see Barratt, 2012). This is especially true since there is a significant barrier
to sales in online markets. Anyone can set up a seller profile and advertise drugs, but only 1% of
them make significant sales. Drug markets have been described as tournament settings where a
rotating set of actors compete to reach the top spots that alone come with significant revenues
(Décary-Hétu, Paquet-Clouston & Aldridge, 2016). As such, online sellers must bide their time
until a spot opens, given that users are most likely to purchase only from established and already
popular sellers (Norbutas, 2020), which may not be related to their offline credentials.
Current Study
Market crimes have been undergoing a silent transformation over the past two, if not three decades.
This transformation began with the rapid technological innovations in the 1990s, followed by the
democratization of communication tools in the 2000s. These realities, although heavily studied in
most social science fields, were barely investigated in criminology. This is easily explained by the
reliance of researchers on official data that has struggled to keep track of cybercrimes. Cybercrimes
can be international, meaning that offenders are located in foreign jurisdictions, and that law
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enforcement is not motivated to file reports and statistics on crimes they cannot police.
Cybercrimes are harder to track in official statistics as well as harder to research. This explains
why few studies have examined the cybercrime offenders, even though cybercrime is suggested to
have overtaken property crime at least in frequency, if not in importance.
The transformation of market crimes begs a significant question: is this transformation the
product of a shift of current offenders or the result of a new breed of offenders who were not active
in crime before? The former would represent a safer answer for criminologists as much of the
theories, approaches, and methods used in the past could still apply to today’s shifting crime.
However, the latter represents an unsettling new reality where much of what has been learned
about crime may simply not be true anymore. With new entrants, a new environment, and possibly
new forms of crime, it is possible that theories vetted time and time again may not hold much water
anymore.
Research opportunities abound in this context, especially to understand if what we believe
to be true about crime still resonates in the digital realm. Suppose criminal experience acquired in
‘street’ or physical markets is positively associated with higher earnings in online drug markets.
In that case, this will shed insight into the pathways of offenders into drug markets. Moreover, if
experience in physical drug markets doesn’t translate into success online, it would suggest a new
type of crime or offender is at hand. Conversely, suppose the individuals transitioning from
physical realms into virtual ones are not able to reap high criminal earnings. In that case, they may
be getting left behind while new cohorts of offenders with technological skills fill the void.
This study builds on past research on traditional drug markets to examine the new digital
realm of drug dealing. While relatively small, with 700 million USD in yearly sales compared to
offline drug markets, online drug markets have multiplied by more than seven since 2013
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(Chainanalysis, 2021). Their anonymity, ease of use, and increasing democratization make them
an ideal new testing ground for many other types of crimes that could shift online. Offenders have
much to lose by leaving a physical market they know to join a digital market where risks and
potential earnings are difficult to assess (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016). This makes online drug
dealing an especially relevant field of research to model the transformation of crime and to
understand how different career paths structure criminal earnings.
Data
Data for this study come from an online survey of drug sellers on the darknet. The use of surveys
to study drug seller populations has a long history in the study of drug markets (Barratt et al., 2012;
Daniulaityte et al., 2018). A digital approach to surveys has recently caught the attention of drug
scholars as a means to survey hidden populations, including cannabis cultivators (Barratt et al.,
2012), cryptomarket vendors (Martin et al., 2020), and drug users (Daniulaityte et al., 2018; Miller
& Sønderlund, 2010). Online surveys provide a novel means to access elusive populations that are
not well understood, as is the case here.
The online survey asked cryptomarket drug vendors about their online and offline drug
selling experiences, drug-related conflicts, vendor networks, and demographics. Important for our
purposes, vendors were asked whether they had sold drugs in physical drug markets, the year they
started selling drugs in physical markets (if applicable), and the year they started selling drugs in
cryptomarkets, allowing us to identify whether a vendors’ onset into drug selling began in an
offline or online milieu. In order to respond to the survey, vendors had to report being at least 18years of age and had made at least one drug sale on a cryptomarket in the past year. All responses
to the survey were automatically saved into a text file.
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Survey recruitment occurred from September 18, 2017, to December 1, 2017. We recruited
cryptomarket drug vendors through three approaches. First, a public advertisement was posted on
the DeepDotWeb, a website dedicated to providing news about the dark web. Importantly,
DeepDotWeb, at the time, provided real-time links to access cryptomarkets, and thus were
frequented by both vendors and buyers. Second, we advertised our survey on Reddit forums on
the clearnet for ten cryptomarkets, which were active at the time.2 Third, vendors with listings on
these ten large cryptomarkets were directly invited to participate in the survey through the markets’
internal messaging systems. In total, 1,091 vendor accounts were invited to participate in the online
survey. A reminder message was sent to sellers previously contacted who still had active accounts
between October 24 and December 1, 2017. In all, 745 individuals opened the survey link that was
sent to them. Of these 745, a total of 133 individuals provided complete or partial responses to the
survey. Here, we focus on 51 vendors who provided information on their year of onset into physical
and online drug markets.
Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents the demographics of our sample. The vast majority of respondents who reported
their sex were male, with only one female responding to the survey. Respondents who reported
their racial/ethnic background identified primarily as White (79%), with some respondents
identifying as East Asian (8%), Other (8%), or Black (4%). The average respondent was 35 years
old (SD = 10), with vendors’ ages ranging from 23 to 56. Most respondents reported a minimum
education level of a high school diploma (93%), with many continuing on to obtain a college or
vocational certificate (22%), a university degree (33%), or a Master’s or Ph.D. (19%). Respondents
came from across the globe, with the majority located in North America (56%), followed by

2

The ten cryptomarkets comprise Aero, Berlusconi, CGMC, Dream Market, Libertas, RSClub Market, Sourcery
Market, Tochka, the Trade Route, and Zion.
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Western Europe (34%), Eastern Europe (6%), and Oceania (3%). However, few respondents
reported their demographics in the survey. Thus any interpretation of these sample characteristics
should keep in mind low response rates across our sample of 51 vendors for all demographic
questions.
TABLE 1
Vendors also reported their activities selling drugs online, including the year they first started
selling drugs online, the number of vendor accounts they managed, whether they collaborated with
others, and the number of hours they dedicated to selling drugs online. On average, vendors had
sold drugs online for 2.8 years (SD = 1.9), with some having only just started and others having
sold drugs for up to six years, back when cryptomarkets had only first emerged. On average,
vendors reported creating 2.1 vendor accounts (SD = 2.1), with a median of one vendor account,
a finding consistent with prior research (Martin et al., 2020). Vendors tended to range in working
with other accomplices, reporting that they worked with an average of 2.6 others to sell drugs on
cryptomarkets (SD = 2.8), ranging from 0 to 10 accomplices. Vendors also reported the number
of hours they spent selling drugs online each week. On average, vendors spent a substantial portion
of their weeks involved in drug selling, 25.6 hours weekly (SD = 23.7), almost a part-time job,
ranging from 1 to 100 hours per week.
Essential to the current study, respondents reported their total earnings selling drugs on a
cryptomarket in the prior year. All respondents reported receiving some income from selling drugs.
Consistent with earlier studies of drug vendors, there was a high degree of variation in criminal
earnings. Vendors reported earning a median of 10,000 USD selling drugs on cryptomarkets (M =
83,404; SD = 243,021), ranging from low earners who made 2,500 USD to high earners who made
over 1 million USD in the prior year. We calculate the hourly wage of cryptomarket drug vendors
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by dividing a vendor’s total reported criminal earnings in a year by the number of weeks and then
dividing this by the average number of hours a vendor worked each week. This measure more
accurately calculates the proficiency of a vendor at earning returns for the amount of time spent
selling drugs. The median hourly wage for a cryptomarket vendor was 15 USD ranging from a low
of two dollars per hour to a high of 344 dollars per hour (M = 48 USD; SD = 85 USD).
Lastly, respondents also reported if and when they had sold drugs in offline markets. Our
sample was nearly evenly split into vendors whose onset into drug selling began in physical versus
digital realms. Out of the 51 cryptomarket drug vendors, 41 percent reported selling drugs offline
prior to entering online drug markets. We refer to these vendors as “Offline-first,” as they began
their selling careers in physical drug markets before transitioning to online ones. Similarly,
“Online-first” vendors comprise individuals who did not report selling drugs offline or engaged in
offline sales the same year they entered online drug markets or within the next few years. The
variation in vendors who began in offline markets compared to those who started online is
consistent with other samples (Martin et al., 2020) and allows us to examine our main question of
interest - whether prior experience in physical drug markets leads to higher earnings online.
Results
Table 2 compares cryptomarket drug vendors whose onset into selling drugs began in online
markets versus those whose onset began in physical markets. We find that vendors whose onset
began in online drug markets had a slightly higher number of years of experience selling drugs
online. On average, vendors who first sold drugs in online markets had 3.0 years of experience
(SD = 2.0). In contrast, vendors who first sold drugs in physical markets had slightly fewer years
of experience, with an average of 2.4 years (SD = 1.8). We also find that vendors who began in
online drug markets tended to set up a slightly higher number of vendor accounts (M = 2.3; SD =
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2.5) than vendors who began in offline markets (M = 1.8; SD = 1.0). Despite having fewer vendor
accounts, vendors who started selling drugs in offline markets had a higher number of accomplices
assisting them with their online sales. On average, vendors who began selling drugs offline had
3.6 co-accomplices (SD = 3.0), whereas vendors who began selling drugs in online markets
reported an average of 2.3 co-accomplices (SD = 2.7). As shown in Table 3, none of the differences
are statistically significant.
TABLE 2
Cryptomarket drug vendors who began selling drugs in offline, face-to-face markets also
reported lower total income from their online drug sales. Vendors who began in offline markets
reported an annual median income of 10,000 USD. In contrast, vendors who began in online
markets reported an annual median income of 11,000 USD. Similar to this, we find that vendors
who began in online markets spend similar amounts of time selling drugs online. On average,
vendors who began online spent 26.5 hours each week managing their cryptomarkets (SD = 24.5),
with some only spending an hour each week and others up to 100 hours. In contrast, vendors who
began in offline markets spent an average of 24.1 hours each week (SD = 23.0), ranging from a
low of two hours to a high of 80 hours each week. However, both report a median of 20 hours per
week in managing their online cryptomarkets. Again, there are no statistically significant bivariate
differences between our online-first and offline-first vendors for their total annual earnings or
number of hours spent selling drugs online.
TABLE 3
Lastly, we examine bivariate differences in the hourly wage for vendors selling drugs
online. We find that, on average, vendors who began selling drugs online make, on average, 20
USD per hour (SD = 22 USD) with a median hourly wage of 13 USD. In contrast, vendors who
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have prior histories of selling drugs offline make, on average, 79 USD per hour (SD = 116 USD),
with a median hourly wage of 18 USD. As shown in Table 3, these differences between vendors
are statistically significant, although we are cautious in making conclusions based on the small
convenience sample. Figure 1 plots the hourly wage of cryptomarket vendors, comparing vendors
who began in online markets versus those who began in offline markets. We show that there are a
high number of vendors who began in online markets reporting a wage between 0-50 USD an hour.
However, the hourly wage of vendors who began offline is more spread out. While a substantial
portion of vendors report earnings in the 1 to 50 USD range, many report much higher earnings
from 50 to 350 USD per hour.
FIGURE 1
Discussion
Our study raises questions about the popular image of online offenders as a distinct cohort of
criminals. Our study suggests that online drug offenders may not be so distinct from their offline
counterparts. In fact, consistent with studies of traditional offenders, those with offline drug selling
experience are more successful than those who only sold drugs online. This suggests that the skills
necessary to be successful in online drug markets may depend, at least partially, on offline
experience. This finding joins a growing body of research that demonstrates that cryptomarkets
show some important similarities with offline markets (Norbutas, 2020).
Our study also provides preliminary evidence that experience accrued in offline settings
leads to higher criminal achievement online. Online drug vendors whose onset began in offline
drug markets had higher illegal wage rates for their online drug sales. This finding suggests that
online drug vendors with prior histories selling in physical drug markets may be more proficient
at receiving returns. Our results are consistent with a long line of research on criminal capital,

16

which shows that prior experience increases the returns to crime. One explanation for these
differences may be that vendors who began selling drugs online have fewer years of experience
than those who began offline. However, as shown earlier, our offline sellers tended to have fewer
years’ experience selling drugs online than those who had begun selling drugs in digital markets.
The differences we do observe between the earnings of online and offline offenders may
be partly explained by the embeddedness of cryptomarkets in physical drug markets. PaquetClouston et al. (2018) showed how vendors must source their drugs in physical markets and that
the shipping of drugs through the postal service constrained who and how illicit drugs could be
sold on the darkweb. Munskgaard (2021) more recently expanded on this idea and investigated the
social aspect of cryptomarkets. He found that transactions were facilitated through social ties and
that the size of transactions was even explained by positive past communications and transactions.
These studies suggest that it would be challenging to dissociate online from offline drug dealing.
However, there are clearly environmental differences that prevent all offline dealers from moving
their business online. This includes mastering anonymizing technologies and even attracting
clientele through showcasing their products on online storefronts.
Our findings are also consistent with prior work emphasizing the role of offline social ties
for cybercrimes (Leukfeldt et al., 2017; 2019; Lusthaus, 2019). Thus, individuals who initially
engaged in drug sales offline may continue to rely on their established contacts with suppliers to
provide a better product and create reliable supply chains. Likewise, it is possible that clients
themselves are moving online and turning to the same suppliers they relied on in physical settings,
which may be able to deliver larger quantities in person. Cryptomarkets may therefore be classified
more as an iterative than a paradigm-shifting innovation, as suggested before (Aldridge & DécaryHétu, 2013).
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Limitations and Conclusion
Drug vendors represent a hidden population that requires innovative study designs to access them.
Much of the research on cryptomarket drug vendors rely on digital trace data available through
product listings and posts publicly reported on cryptomarkets (e.g., Duxbury & Haynie, 2018;
2021; Martin et al., 2018; Norbutas, 2020; Soska & Christin, 2013). This has led to unprecedented
access to the transactions of drug vendors; however, it misses information on the vendors
themselves. The current study aimed to fill this void by reaching out directly to vendors about their
online drug sales. However, this raises concerns about issues of selection bias and the reliability
and validity of responses. We attempted to assuage concerns about the validity of responses by
ensuring the anonymity of the respondents, such as disabling JavaScript of the survey so that we
could not identify any information about the respondents and maintain the anonymity of the
individuals who accessed it. In addition, we only advertised the survey through news sites popular
to drug market vendors, including Reddit, direct messages to vendors, and the dark web news
forum DeepDotWeb. We assume that each entry is from a separate vendor; however, we are unable
to verify multiple responses.
Interpretation of the study’s findings should consider that our estimates of criminal
earnings come from self-reports. Although self-reports of criminal earnings have been shown to
be reliable and valid measures in physical markets (Nguyen, 2020), this finding has not been
extended to online surveys. If we compare our estimates of criminal earnings to other studies using
transaction data available on cryptomarkets, we find similar results. For instance, Décary-Hétu et
al. (2016) estimated vendors’ yearly revenue on cryptomarkets to range from zero USD to
1,484,334 USD with a median of 7,296 USD, which is comparable to our median of 10,000 USD
annually, particularly when you consider that one vendor account may reflect more than one
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individual. However, to our knowledge, estimates of vendors’ offline drug sale histories are not
available and would be challenging to obtain. These estimates provide an insider’s look into the
background of vendors online.
The findings of this study are exploratory and rely on survey techniques of dark web drug
vendors. Although this represents one of the largest samples of cryptomarket vendors, it is still
quite small and only represents the first step towards better understanding this population. We
know moreover that online drug vendors are active on other platforms. The challenges with
accessing Tor and exchanges in cryptocurrencies means that many drug sales will occur on other
platforms such as social media sites (see Bakken & Demant, 2019). We encourage future research
to move beyond the darknet and explore online illicit drug sales in the wider context of the internet.
The current study provides a first step, but more information is needed about entry into online drug
sales. For instance, how do drug sellers make the transition into online markets? Prior research
suggests that online drug vendors used to be buyers, procuring drugs from online markets before
making the switch (Martin et al., 2020). But this tells us very little about the processes and
mechanisms that drive the shift from offline to online. The barriers that drive this shift may be key
to understanding offender pathways and developing future prevention strategies.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics of Online Drug Vendors
N
Mean
SD
Age
20
35.050
10.272
Male
24
0.958
0.204
Race/Ethnicity
White
24
0.792
0.415
East Asian
24
0.083
0.282
Black
24
0.042
0.204
Other
24
0.083
0.282
Education
No High School
27
0.074
0.267
High School
27
0.185
0.396
College
27
0.222
0.424
University
27
0.333
0.480
Graduate
27
0.185
0.396
Continent
North America
32
0.563
0.504
Western Europe
32
0.344
0.483
Eastern Europe
32
0.063
0.246
Oceania
32
0.031
0.177
N years sold drugs online
51
2.765
1.924
N vendor accounts
35
2.114
2.125
N co-offenders
37
2.647
2.806
Value drug sales past yr
($)
35
83,404
243,021
N hours spent selling
drugs online (weekly)
49
25.551
23.740
Hourly wage selling drugs
online ($)
34
47.810
85.303
Sold drugs offline prior to
selling online
51
0.412
0.497

Median
32.5
1

Range
23-56
0-1

1
0
0
0

0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

0
0
0
0
0

0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

1
0
0
0
3
1
2

0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-6
1-10
0-10

10,000

600-1,280,000

20

1-100

15.4533

1.803-344.497

0

0-1
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Table 2. Comparison of Drug Selling Experiences between Vendors Who Began Selling
Drugs Offline and Vendors Who Began Selling Drugs Online
Online-First
N
Mean
SD
Median
Range
N years sold drugs
online
30
3.033
1.991
3
0-6
N vendor accounts
23
2.304
2.530
1
1-10
N co-offenders
24
2.250
2.691
1
0-10
Value drug sales past
yr ($)
18
35,089
61,429
11,000
600-250,000
N hours spent selling
drugs online (weekly)
30
26.500
24.541
20
1-100
Hourly wage selling
drugs online ($)
18
19.738
21.829
13.049
2.404-96.154
Offline-first
N
Mean
SD
Median
Range
N years sold drugs
online
21
2.381
1.802
2
0-5
N vendor accounts
12
1.750
0.965
1
1-4
N co-offenders
10
3.600
2.989
3
0-9
Value drug sales past
yr ($)
17
134,562
340,713
10,000
2,500-1,280,000
N hours spent selling
drugs online (weekly)
19
24.053
22.994
20
2-80
Hourly wage selling
drugs online ($)
16
79.390
116.013
17.628
1.803-344.497
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Table 3. Bivariate Tests Comparing Drug Selling Experience
Online vs. Offline-first Cryptomarket Vendors
N
r
p-value
N years sold drugs online
51
-.169
.237
N vendor accounts
35
-.126
.472
N co-offenders
34
.223
.206
Value drug sales past yr ($)
35
.208
.232
N hours spent selling drugs online
49
-.051
.729
(weekly)
Hourly wage selling drugs online
34
.354
.040
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Figure 1. Hourly Wage of Vendors Selling Drugs Online, Comparison of Vendors Who
Began Selling Drugs Offline and Vendors Who Began Selling Drugs Online. N = 34
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